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This paper shows that theory and evidence are more supportive
of the link between increasing trade with developing countries and
increasing u.s. wage inequality than recent criticisms have led
many to believe. Much of the current debate focuses on the idea
that relative goods prices must change for relative wages to
change. The paper first demonstrates several additional channels
through which an expansion of North-South trade causes a fall in
the relative wage of unskilled workers in the North, even when
there are no changes in relative output prices. It then explores
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Changes in trade with developing countries are shown to have
widened wages between low-skilled and high-skilled workers by 3.4
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International Trade and Wage Inequality in the United States:
Some New Results
The effects of U.S. trade with developing countries on U.S.
wage inequality and emploYment patterns continue to be a subject
of enormous contention. The charge that U.S.-developing country
trade lowers the wages of unskilled U.S. workers, or perhaps all
U.S. workers, has entered the U.S. political debate with
considerable force, and the debate among economists has heated up
as well. The range of opinion is enormous, sometimes even within
the writings of the same author. Paul Krugman (1995a), for
example, dismissed fears of low-wage trade competition as nothing
more than the confu$ion of the 19th century "pauper labour
argument" re-visited. A few months later, Krugman (1995b)
acknowledged that growing North-South trade could account for
some, but not most, of the widening inequality. More recently,
Krugman and co-author Anthony Venables (1995) have presented a
theoretical model in which the falling cost of international
transport, and therefore rising international trade between the
"North" (developed countries) and the "South" (developing
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countries), can eventually lead to an absolute decline in the
wage levels of the North, as a result of deindustrialization and
convergence of income with the South. This model suggests that
the "pauper labour argument" is not simply confusion, but rather
an unresolved empirical question.
In fact, a wide range of theories suggests that increased
trade with developing countries, whether the result of falling
transport costs t or falling protectionist barriers t or increased
capacity of developing countries to produce goods for world
markets t can lead to downward pressures on low-skilled wages.
Theory also suggests circumstances in which increased trade will
not produce such downward pressures. Most importantly, if the
developing countries are producing and exporting goods to the
u.S. that are not produced in the u.S. economYt then low-wage
workers will not in general feel the brunt of increased trade
flows.
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model, with its Stolper-
Samuelson corollary, is the benchmark theoretical treatment of
North-South trade, i.e., trade between high-wage and low-wage
economies (see t for example, Lawrence and Slaughter t 1993; Wood,
1994; Sachs and Shatz t 1994; and Leamer, 1995, for discussions
revolving around the HOS model)
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The baseline model in recent
debates rests on the following assumptions. There are two kinds
of factor inputs, skilled labor, Ls, and unskilled labor, Lu.
There are two output sectors as well. To economize on subscripts
and superscripts, we denote the skill-intensive sector as S, and
the unskilled-intensive sector as V. Let Lij be the input of Li
in sector j. Then, we assume Luu/Lsu > Lus/Lss at all factor
prices. There are constant returns to scale in production,
perfect competition, full employment, and identical technologies
in both countries. The skill-intensive good is numeraire (Ps =
1), and Pu denotes the relative price of V. The wage (in units
of the numeraire, of course) is Wu for Lu, and Ws for Ls.
Now, assume a rise in trade between the the skill-intensive
economy (the North) and the unskilled-intensive economy (the
South) due to the elimination of protectionist barriers.
Comparing the free trade equilibrium with autarky, the HOS theory
predicts: (1) a rise in the production, and export, of S in the
North, and in the production, and export, of V in the South; (2)
a fall in Pu, the relative price of V, in the North; (3) a fall
in the relative wage of unskilled workers in the North, Wu/Ws
(and in the relative wage of skilled workers in the South); and
(4) a rise in the ratio of unskilled to skilled workers in each
sector in the North, as firms economize on skilled workers after
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the rise in their relative wage. Thus, (Lui/Lsi) rises in each
sector i (i=U,S)
If we consider the period of the 1980s as one of falling
trade barriers in the developing countries (see Sachs and Warner,
1995, for a demonstration of this point), how do the various
predictions of the HOS model fare in empirical terms?
Predictions (1) and (3) seem to be consistent with the data.
U.S. production and net exports of unskilled-intensive goods have
declined in the past two decades, while net imports of these
goods from developing countries have risen. At the same time,
the relative wage of low-skilled workers has fallen significantly
in the U.S. This basic correlation of increased U.S. trade with
developing countries and U.S. relative wage trends is, of course,
the starting point of the controversy. Prediction (4) seems to
be contrary to the facts, since virtually all manufacturing
sectors in the U.S. have experienced a reduction in Lu/Ls, rather
than an increase, despite the fall in WU/Ws. This pattern
suggests that technological shifts ("unskilled-saving technical
change") are at work, perhaps in addition to the effects of
trade.
A significant controvery has arisen around Prediction (2).
There is no conclusive agreement among researchers on the trends
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of relative prices of low-skilled goods (e.g. apparel, footwear,
assembly operations). The absence of clear evidence on relative
price trends has led some observers, especially Bhagwati and
Dehejia (1994) and Bhagwati (1995), to conclude that trade must
have played a small or insignificant role in the widening of u.s.
wage inequality. Bhagwati argues that increased trade with
developing countries can be the culprit in rising wage inequality
only if the relative prices of U-goods have declined; since they
have not, trade must not be the cause of widening wage
inequalities. (Krugman and Lawrence, 1994, also point to the
price data, and to the circumstantial evidence in favor of Lu-
saving technical change, to suggest that it is technology rather
than trade which accounts for the observed wage trends) .
In our view, the conclusion that trade has played a small or
even insignificant ~ole in widening u.s. wage inequality is
premature, and perhaps simply incorrect, for two reasons. First,
the HOS model is not the only theoretical basis for a link
between trade and relative wages. There are, in fact, many
channels by which increased trade with low-wage countries could
lead to a fall in the relative or absolute wages of unskilled
workers. For example, the Krugman and Venables (1995) study is
based on agglomeration economies arising from transport costs and
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increasing returns to scale, rather than from HOS assumptions,
yet it still delivers the prediction of factor-price equalization
between North and South as transport costs fall to low levels.
The first part of the present paper demonstrates several
additional channels through which an expansion of North-South
trade causes a fall in the relative wage of unskilled workers in
the North, even when there are no changes in relative output
prices.
Second, the evidence on relative prices is much more
supportive of HOS predictions than Bhagwati or some others have
suggested. Because of the so-called ~magnification effect,"
according to which relative price changes lead to more-than-
proportionate changes in relative wages, even very small changes
in relative prices -- hard to detect in the data -- would be
consistent with large relative wage movements. Krugman (1995b)
makes an illustrative calculation in which the magnification
effect is roughly 3: a 1 perecent reduction in the relative price
of unskilled-intensive goods leads to a 3 percent reduction in
the relative wage of unskilled workers. In fact, there are
reasons to believe that the relative price of unskilled-intensive
goods has in fact declined during the past fifteen years, by an
economically meaningful margin.
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It is the purpose of this paper to show that theory and
evidence are more supportive of the trade-wage link than recent
criticisms have led many to believe. The first part of this
paper emphasizes the theoretical robustness of the trade-wage
linkage, even beyond the assumptions of the HOS model. The second
part of the paper revisits the empirical evidence, especially the
price data, and shows that in fact the weight of the evidence
points to economically significant relative price movements of
the sort predicted by the HOS model.
II. Theoretical Issues
Increased trade with between the u.s. and low-wage
developing countries could put downward pressure on u.s.
unskilled wages for many reasons. The HOS model emphasizes one:
the fall in the relative price of U goods, which is then passed
through to the wages of unskilled workers. There are, in fact, a
variety of ways that the same outcome may apply even when Pu does
not change.
A. Capital Mobility
The first, and potentially very important, channel in
addition to HOS is capital mobility.
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If the capital stock of Lu-
intensive sectors can move from the U.S. to developing countries,
then WU/Ws can decline even if there is no change in Pu.
Consider the following simple model to illustrate this point. We
assume that there are two tradeable sectors, Sand U, as well as
a nontradeable sector N. The S sector is a final good, while U
is an intermediate good used in the production of S. The price
of S is taken as numeraire, and Pu lS the relative price of the
U, and Pn is the relative price of N. The unskilled good U is
produced either domestically, with output Du, or in the partner
country, with output Fu. Ku is the capital stock used in U
production, and is divided between U.S.-based enterprises (Kd)
and foreign-based enterprises (Kf), with Ku = Kd + Kf. Capital
is sector specific, so that Ku cannot be used in N production and
Kn cannot be used in U production.
The full model .is as follows:
(1 ) S = S(Ls, U) production function of S
(2 ) Du min (Luu, Kd) production function of Du
(3 ) Fu = Kf production of Fu
(4 ) L*uu Kf foreign labor employed in Fu
(5) U = Du + Fu total production of U
(6 ) Kd = Ku - Kf domestic capital stock in U
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(7) N = N(Lun, Kn)
(8 ) Lu Luu + Lun
(9 ) Ws as/aLs
(10 ) Wu = Pn (aN/aLun)
(11) .. Pu as/au
(12) [If = PuFu - W*u(L*uu)
(13) y S-PuFu+PnN + [If
(14) N f (Y, Pn)
production function of N
total unskilled labor
labor demand for Ls in S
labor demand for Lu in N
demand for U ln S
quasi-rents (profits) on Kf
definition of national income
final demand for nontradeables
The production functions for Sand N are standard neoclassical,
constant-returns-to-scale production functions. The skilled labor
force is fixed at Ls, and is fully employed in the S sector. The
unskilled labor force is fixed at LU, and is divided between the
domestic U sector (Luu) and the nontradeable sector (Lun). The
amoung of Ku alloca~ed to the foreign country, Kf, is taken to be
exogenous, and is presumed to be determined by the regulations
governing foreign direct investment in the South (as well as by
country risk, relative factor prices, tax policies, and other
considerations). Foreign output and labor input ln the
production of Fu are determined by the amount of Kf, according to
(3) and (4). The home country takes the foreign wage in the U
sector as given. Presumably, W*u «Wu. Therefore, the quasi-
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rents earned by Ku are higher when employed abroad than at home.
Full capital mobility would lead to Kf = Ku, Kd = o.
Notice that the supply of U is fixed, since U = Du + Fu = Kd
+ Kf = K. Thus, U may be produced at home or abroad, but the
total amount of U is unchanging. Since both Ls and U are fixed,
the supply of S is also fixed. Moreover, the marginal product of
Ls is also fixed, so that Ws is fixed, according to (9). The
marginal product of U in the production of S is also fixed.
Therefore, Pu is fixed, according to (11), since as/aU is a
function of U/Ls, which is fixed.
Now, suppose that the developing country liberalizes its
foreign investment regime, so that it becomes possible to shift
more of Ku to the foreign country. Since Wu* is less than Wu,
entreprenuers will want to shift capital to Kf, in order to earn
higher quasi-rents. We assume that the permitted shift in Kf is
exogenous, and look at the comparative static effects of aKf > O.
As Kd falls, Luu declines by an equal amount, and Lun rises by
the same amount. Low-skilled workers lose their jobs in
tradeables and are forced to find jobs in non-tradeables. The
production of nontradeables goods increases. The wage of low-
skilled workers will be determined by (10), with Wu equal to the
marginal value product of labor in N.
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Since the employment in N
is rising, with an unchanged capital stock, the physical marginal
product aN/aLun will decrease.
Pn may rise or fall. Pn will tend to fall because of the
increased production of Ni it may rise, however, because of a
positive income effect, i.e. a rise in Y in (13). This is due to
the increased quasi-rents enjoyed by the owners of Kf. As long
as the income effect is relatively small (either af/ay lS small,
or W*u is close to WU), then Pn will fall. In this case, Wu
surely declines, since Wu = Pn(aN/aLun). Note, therefore, that
Wu can fall even though Pu remains completely unchanged.
This mechanism, whether or not it is empirically important,
is certainly in the minds of those who argue that increased trade
with developing countries is "eliminating jobs" in the U-sectors
within manufacturing. As capital moves to the low-wage foreign
country, overall manufacturing employment is reduced, and
unskilled workers are pushed into the nontradeables sector. Note
that the shift of capital abroad does not have to show up in the
data as foreign direct investment or outsourcing, since the
physical capital could actually be sold outright to a foreign
producer. For example, the machinery In a U.S. footwear firm
could be sold on the secondary market to a Chinese producer, so
that the imports of Chinese footwear would not show up as
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outsourcing by a u.s. firm, nor as foreign direct investment. 1
In case that Kf is the result of foreign direct investment,
it is worthwhile noting the balance-of-payments accounting of a
rise in Kf. From the production side, Y = (S-PuFu) + PnN + nf,
and from the final-demand side Y = Cs + PnN, where Cs is the
final domestic demand for S. The trade deficit is equal to the
net imports of S plus the net imports of U, or TD = (Cs - S) +
PuFu, so that TD = nf. Thus, the trade deficit is equal to the
earnings on foreign direct investment. The u.s. becomes a
rentier country, running a trade deficit financed by profits on
overseas investment. This clears up the confusion raised by
Krugman (1994), in which he erroneously argued that ~large-scale
deindustrialization can take place only if low-wage nations are
major exporters of capital to high-wage nations." The low-wage
countries run export surplus, which pay for the repatriation of
profits on foreign direct investment from the North.
with a small amendment to the technological assumptions, we
lFeenstra and Hanson (1995) also consider the effects of
capital mobility on relative wages. They develop a theoretical
model in which an increase in the capital stock of developing
countries relative to that of advanced countries decreases the
relative wage of unskilled workers in both regions and increases
the prices of the more skilled activities. They also examine
empirical evidence and find these patterns in U.S.-Mexican
economic relations.
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can get a simple and interesting expression for the change in
wage inequality. Suppose now that production of S requires
sector-specific capital, Ks, as well as Ls and U, according to
(1') S S(min(Lss,Ks), U)
as/au, which will be unaffected by
Suppose also that the production of Du and N use skilled labor as
well as unskilled labor, so that
(2') Du = min[Luu, LUs/~, Kd]
(7') N = N(Lun, Lsn, Kn)
In the short term, Ks and Kn are fixed and sector specific. Lss
is therefore also fixed, according to the fixed coefficients
technology in (1'). As before, Pu will be unchanged when Ku is
shifted abroad, since Pu
the rise in Kf.
The fall in Kd, by contrast, releases both Lu and Ls from
the Du sector, forcing their re-employment in the nontradeables
sector. Specifically, aLun = -aKd>O and aLus = -~(aKd»O.
According to (7'), the relative wage of skilled and unskilled
workers is governed by the relative supplies of Lun and Lsn.
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Letting asu be the Hick's elasticity of substitution between Lun
and Lus in the production of N, we can write:
(15) wu - ws ~ -(lu - ls)/asu
where the lower-case variable signifies the proportionate change
of the upper-case variable (i.e. wu = aWu/Wu). According to
(15), the proportionate widening of the gap between low-skilled
and high-skilled workers is determined in the nontradeables
market, according to the changing ratio of unskilled to skilled
workers in the N sector. As long as the ratio of unskilled to
skilled labor released from Du is greater than the pre-existing
ratio of unskilled to skilled labor in nontradeables, the
nontradeables sector must become more intensive in unskilled
labor than it was p~eviously. To absorb this higher proportion
of unskilled labor, the relative wage of unskilled labor must
decline.
B. Import Competition with Monopolistic Import-Competing Sector
Consider now a slightly different mechanism, depending on
imperfect competition, that leads to the same shift of unskilled
labor from tradeables to nontradeables. Return to the orginal
14
model, (1) (14). Suppose, however, that Kd is fixed, with no
mobility of capital abroad (Kf = 0), or profits from foreign
investment. Foreign production is now limited by the size of the
foreign-owned capital stock, so that (3) becomes:
Fu K*f
Suppose also that the domestic U industry is monopolised, while
the foreign industry is made up of competitive firms with a total
output Fu. Thus, the foreign imports represent a competitive
fringe of the domestic monopolist. We introduce one more key
assumption. Suppose now that the production technology Du =
min (Lud, Kd) represents the low-marginal-cost method of
production of U, but there exists another method potentially
available at world ~rice p* (this could represent an alternative
imported input, for which the U.S. is a price taker). Assuming
that Wu < P*, it pays to use the technology in (2), since
marginal costs are lower. Even in this case, however, the
domestic monopolist will be unable to charge a price higher than
P*, since a price of p* would elicit an infinitely elastic supply
of the high-cost alternative to U.
The demand curve for the domestic monopolist is easily
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found. The derived demand for U is determined in (1) such that
as/aU = Pu, for the price range 0 ~ Pu ~ P*. This implicitly
determines a market-demand equation U = U(Ls,Pu). Since U = Du +
Fu, the derived demand for the domestic producer is Du =
U(Ls,Pu) - Fu. For the monopolist, Ls and Fu are given, and Pu
is the choice variable. For an inelastic derived demand for U,
the domestic monopolist should set the domestic price at the
limit price P*, i.e. at the maximum level such that the input at
price p* will not be used. Then, domestic production is equal to
U(Ls,P*) - Fu. Note that the foreign competitive firms also sell
into the U.S. market at the price P*, earning pure quasi-rents on
K*f. These quasi-rents are earned because of the fixed short-run
supply of foreign capacity in the production of U.
Notice, then, what happens when the foreign firms increase
their production and export capacity as the result of an increase
in K*f. The U.S. monopolist keeps the U.S. market price
unchanged at P*, and absorbs the increased foreign competition
by a one-for-one reduction of domestic production. Therefore, as
Fu increases by one unit, Du falls by one unit. This prompts an
equivalent reduction in employment of Luu, and the laid-off
unskilled worker must find work in the nontradeables sector. The
increased nontradeable sector employment results in a fall in the
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marginal physical product of labor in the nontradeable sector,
i.e. aNjaLun falls. Also, Pn falls as the result of a rising
supply of N combined with a negative income effect on the demand
for N (monopoly profits are diminished by the increased
competition from abroad). Thus, the wage of unskilled workers
will fall, since Wu = Pn(aNjaLun), and both Pn and aNjaLun
decline.
Note that in this model, the trade balance must be zero, so
that the imports of Fu are paid for by the exports of S. Higher
Fu (caused by a rise in K*f) prompts a negative income effect,
which causes a decline in domestic consumption of the tradeable
final good S. This leads to a larger trade surplus of S, which
pays for the imports of Fu.
We can easily extend the model to include employment of
skilled labor in Du.and N, as we did before. Once again, the
rise in K*f will elicit a shift of both unskilled and skilled
labor to the nontradeables sector. As long as the ratio of
unskilled to skilled workers rises in the nontradeables sector as
a result of this influx of labor, the relative wage of unskilled
workers will decline.
C. Increasing Division of Labor and the Scope of the Market
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A third possibility for a fall In Wu/Ws emerges from the
classical idea that the division of labor in the economy is
limited by the scope of the market. Robert Frank and Philip Cook
(1995) have recently argued that the rising inequality in U.S.
labor markets results partly from the fact that global markets
extend the ability of the top-quality producers to reach an
international marketplace. We use the framework of Murphy,
Shliefer, and Vishny, (hereafter MSV, 1989) to construct a simple
example of how internationalization can widen wage inequalities,
and once again, to highlight the differences with the HOS
model,we study a case in which relative output market prices are
unchanging.
Suppose that there are a number of goods that may all be
produced by a standardized technology:
(16) Qi Li
(17) Li Lui + Lsi
Output of sector i is equal to total labor input, and labor input
is to the simple sum of unskilled and skilled labor. According
to this technology, there is no market advantage to have labor
skills. Now, suppose that for each sector, there is an
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alternative advanced technology which requires a fixed cost F of
skilled labor and then allows production at a lower marginal
cost, i.e.
(18) Qi e (Liu+Lis), with e > 1 and fixed cost Lsi = F
Suppose that there are N sectors in total, but that NF » Ls.
There is a shortage of skilled workers, so that only a fraction
of sectors will be able to engage in high-technology production.
For simplicity, we will assume that F = Ls, that is, there is
just enough skilled labor in the economy to support high-tech
production in a single sector. (This assumption could easily be
relaxed; we take the simplest case for purposes of illustration)
The scarcity of skilled labor will allow it to earn a premium
once high-technology production is introduced.
We also assume that the high technology 1S proprietary,
monopolized by a single firm in each sector: high-tech
production, if carried out at all, will be carried out by a
monopolist. Finally, we assume that market demand is governed by
a standard CES utility function over the N goods, of the form:
(19 ) [(l/N)L: Ci-P]-l/P
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Of course, this leads to a market-demand for output of sector l
given by:
(l/N) (pjP) -cry with 0- 1/ (l+p)
where P is the true price index corresponding to (19). We assume
that p > 0, so that 0- < 1, i.e. market demand for each output is
price inelastic.
Consider first a closed-economy variant of the model. We
start by analysing the equilibrium in which all sectors use low-
technology production. Labor is divided equally among the N
sectors. Setting the wage of unskilled workers as numeraire, it
is clear that Ws pi = Wu 1 for all goods i. Production is
simply Qi = {Lu + Ls)/N.
Now we ask whe~her any single monopolist will choose to
engage in high-tech production, assuming that the other N-1
sectors are engaged in low-tech production. Notice that the
monopolist's pricing strategy is straightforward. Since the
elasticity of demand for sector i is 0- < 1, and is therefore
always inelastic, the monopolist will raise the price as high as
possible without provoking entry by the low-technology
competitive fringe. In other words, the monopolist will set the
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price of sector i at 1 (or just infintesimally below 1). Market
demand will therefore be yiN. Total marginal production costs
are (Y/N)/8i fixed costs are WsF, and profits ni will be:
(21) ni (yiN) - (Y/N)/8 - WsF
Notice that Ws must be greater than or equal to 1, since
skilled workers can always earn a wage equal to 1 by working in
low-tech production. Initially, with no high-tech production in
the economy, Ws = 1. Since Y = Lu + Ls, the conditions for
positive profits in the introduction of high-tech production is:
(22) ni ~ a iff F ~ [(8-1) 18] (Lu + Ls) IN
Clearly, if 8 is clqse to 1 and (Lu+ Ls)/N is small, then profits
would be negative, and the high-technology will not be adopted.
Market demand, measured as average employment per sector, is too
small to cover the fixed cost F. 2
2As MSV point out, it may be possible that high-tech
production is feasible if a group of high-tech monopolists
simultaneously choose the high-tech production strategy, since
the increased output of each one could spillover to raise the
market demand of the others. We have ruled out this particular
possibility for simplicity, by assuming that there is only enough
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When the economy is opened to trade, all sectors are subject
to the aggregate demand given by:
(23 ) (l/N) (PjP)-cr(y + y*)
Notice that world demand has now replaced domestic demand in each
sector's demand function. A potential high-tech monopolist would
now be able to export to world markets. Once again, the
monopolist would set a market price of 1, so the opening of world
trade would not change the relative prices of goods, but it would
expand the market, thereby allowing a change in production
technology. It is easy to check the new zero profit condition,
under the initial condition that Ws = 1. We find:
(22') [Ii ~ a iff F:<::; [(8-1)/8] (Lu + Ls + Y*)/N
Clearly, for a large enough value of Y*, it is possible for high-
technology production to be profitable in the open economy, when
it is not in the closed economy.
Assuming that high-technology production is profitable, all
skilled labor to supply one high-tech sector.
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potential monopolists will bid for the skilled labor. The
skilled wage will rise until the point where the pure profits of
high-tech production are exhausted, i.e., the profits are
converted entirely into quasi-rents earned by the scarce factor,
skilled labor.
we find that
From (22'), and the zero profit condition ~i = 0,
(24) Ws [(8-1) /8] (Lu + Ls + D*) / (F*N) > 1
The conclusion is the following. Trade liberalization
raises the real wage of high-skilled workers, even though it does
not affect relative output prices or the real wage of low-skilled
workrs. The larger world market allows for a change in
technology to the benefit of high-skilled workers. Note that
low-skilled workers .do not suffer, since they face the same wages
and output prices as in the closed economy. The skilled workers,
by contrast, enjoy an absolute gain in utility.
D. Multiple channels of influence
We have identified several channels through which increased
u.s. trade with developing countries can lower the relative wages
of unskilled labor: the HOS effect, operating through a fall in
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Pu; capital flows from the U.S. to developing countries, reducing
the capital stock, and thereby the employment of unskilled
workers in manufacturing; increased import-competition facing a
domestic monopolist, thereby prompting a loss of manufacturing-
sector jobs of unskilled labor; and an increased division of
labor (proxied by a technology with higher fixed costs, but lower
variable costs), made possible by an expansion of the market.
No theoretical, simulation, or econometric model yet exists
which integrates these various forces, but there is no reason why
they cannot all simultaneously operate. Labor markets tend to be
segmented in the short term, so that workers in different sectors
might be subjected to different kinds of influences. In some
sectors, the physical capital is easily transported to low-wage
countries; in other sectors, increased import competition causes
job losses of domestic monopolists; in still other sectors, a
fall in the relative price of unskilled-intensive goods delivers
HOS-type effects, even though they apply to just a subset of the
labor market.
For this reason alone, the search for trade effects should
not be limited to a specific phenomenon, such as the fall in Pu.
It is not correct to conclude that trade has had little effect on
Wu/Ws since Pu has not declined, even putting aside the question
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of the empirical evidence on the trend in Pu. Economists will
have to look over the range of evidence: trade flows, employment
changes, shifts in technology, and price changes, in order to
reach an appropriate assessment of the effects of trade on wage
inequality.
III. Empirical Implications
Earlier studies have uncovered several important facts
concerning trends in u.s. trade, wages, and employment. These
include the following: (1) U.S. trade with low-wage countries
tends to conform broadly to the expected HaS pattern. On
average, the u.S. exports skill-intensive goods, and imports
labor-intensive goods from the developing countries;
(2) U.S. trade with low-wage countries increased significantly
during the 1980s, with trade measured as a percentage of
manufacturing value added and economy-wide GDP; and (3) the
timing of the widening of wage inequality is similar to the
timing of increased U.S. trade with low-wage countries
(increasing throughout the 1980s), though the timing of both
shifts is imprecise, with the dating of turning points depending
on the particular measures that are examined.
The linkages of changing trade patterns to changing
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employment patterns has been studied in many works, such as
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1992), Sachs and Shatz (1994), and
Saeger (1995). The first two of these studies examine the
employment content of changing net trade vectors. As predicted
by HOS, the rise of net imports from developing countries is
unskilled-intensive relative to the rest of the manufacturing
sector.
This can be seen in Table 1, reproduced from Sachs and Shatz
(1994, Table 13, p. 29), which shows the factor content of the
changing net trade with developing and developed countries. 131
manufacturing sectors are ranked by decile, in order of
decreasing skill intensity (in this study, skilled labor is
equated with non-production workers, and unskilled labor is
equated with production workers). For each decile and for all
manufacturing, we measure the implicit decline in employment of
skilled (nonproduction), unskilled (production), and all workers
due to the rise of net imports from developing, developed, and
all countries between 1978 and 1990, compared with a
counterfactual in which net trade relative to final demand in
each sector is assumed to remain at its 1978 level. By this
definition of the counterfactual, increased trade with low-wage
countries reduced the employment of low-skilled workers by 6.2
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percent, and that of high-skilled workers by 3.3 percent between
1978 and 1990. Trade with all countries reduced low-skilled
employment by 7.2 percent, and high-skilled emploYment by 2.1
percent. In the lowest-skilled decile, more than one quarter of
all jobs in 1978, 27.1 percent, were eliminated by trade. Trade
with low-wage countries caused 23.5 percentage points of the
change, while trade with advanced countries caused only 3.6
percentage points.
Perhaps equally important, the net import vector is
unskilled-intensive relative to the rest of the economy as well,
suggesting that labor shed from the manufacturing sector would
require a rise in the ratio LulLs in the nontradeable sector. We
make this argument in two steps. First, Saeger (1995) shows that
increased net imports from developing countries are indeed
associated with overall "deindustrialization," defined in this
case as a declining share of the labor force in manufacturing.
Controlling for per capita income and other structural
characteristics of the economy (e.g. changes in natural resource
production as a percent of GDP), increased net imports of
manufactures from developing countries are associated with
decreases in overall employment in manufacturing, measured as a
percent of total employment. On average, within the OEeD
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economies, the rising net imports from developing countries in
the 1970s and 1980s can be associated with a decline in the share
of manufacturing employment ln overall employment of around 2-3
percentage points. For the U.S., Saeger estimates the effect to
be a decline of around 2.7 percentage points, about one-third of
the total decrease in the manufacturing share of employment.
The labor released from U.S. manufacturing as a result of
increased net imports from developing countries must be absorbed
by the nontradeables sector, mainly services, or by unemployment,
as is more typically the case in the European context of
downwardly rigid wages. It is necessary, therefore, to compare
the skill intensity of the labor released from import-competing
sectors and the skill intensity of the nontradeables sectors.
For this purpose, we equate unskilled workers with high-school or
lower education l and skilled workers with above-high-school
education. (We measure Lu and Ls in this waYI rather than as
production versus non-production workers, since the education-
based measure is a more appropriate yardstick than the
production-based measure for the non-manufacturing sector)
One categorization is shown in Table 2 1 where we compare the
(education-based) ratio Lu/Ls for various manufacturing sectors.
We first rank the sectors into deciles l from highest Ls/Lu to
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lowest, grouping the industries so that each decile has
approximately the same level of 1979 employment. We also take
two weighted sums of LulLs over 131 manufacturing sectors.
First, we weight by each sector's share in u.s. manufacturing
exports to developing countries, wi x , and then by each sector's
share in manufacturing imports from developing countries, W .X 3 4l •
We see that u.s. exports to developing countries are more skill-
intensive than u.s. imports from developing countries, and that
the relationship holds throughout the 1980s.
In Table 3/ we show the same ratios, LulLs/ for
3The weights wi x is defined as Xi/~Xj, where xi is u.s.
exports to low-wage countries from sector i/ and ~Xj is total
u.s. manufacturing exports to low-wage countries (the sum over
all sectors). The weights Wi ffi is defined as Mi/~Mj, where Mi is
u.s. imports from low-wage countries in sector i, and ~Mj is
total u.s. manufacturing imports from low-wage countries.
4Rather than using trade with all developing countries/ we
use trade with only the top nine developing-country trade
partners, Brazil, China/ Hong Kong/ Korea/ Mexico/ Malaysia/
Singapore/ Taiwan/ and Thailand. These nine countries accounted
for 79 percent of the growth in trade from LDCs between 1978 and
1990. In 1978 they accounted for 16.2 percent of all imports to
the U.S./ and 13.6 percent of all exports from the u.s. By 1990/
they accounted for 26.8 percent of all u.s. imports, and 21.9
percent of all u.s. exports. In addition/ in 1978 they accounted
for 55.6 percent of all developing country imports to the u.s.
and 37.2 percent of all developing country exports from the u.s.
By 1990/ these figures were 73.7 percent and 62.1 percent/
respectively.
29
manufacturing as a whole, the nontraded sector including
government, and the private nontraded sector. It is clear that
manufacturing is far less skilled than the nontraded sector,
whether the latter includes government or not. Comparing Table 2
and Table 3, it is also clear that both the import-competing and
export-competing sectors of manufacturing are less skill-
intensive than the nontraded sector, though the import-competing
industries are far less so. A cutback in manufacturing
employment (and especially import-competing manufacturing
employment) will therefore release relatively unskilled workers
into the service sector, leading to a fall in the relative wage
of unskilled workers, with the effect being larger should those
employees come from the import-competing sector of manufacturing.
The precise magnitude of this effect is of course much
harder to determine~ As a crude estimate, we examine the
following counterfactual. How much lower would Lsn and Lun have
been if the net trade vector with developing countries had
remained unchanged after 1978, so that labor would not have been
"released" from the manufacturing sector? (As before, we define
"unchanged" in the counterfactual as an unchanging ratio of net
trade to final demand in each manufacturing sector) . Panel A of
Table 4 shows the results of the counterfactual when workers are
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categorized as low skill if they have a high school education or
less, and high skill if they have some college. We estimate that
due to changes in net trade, manufacturing lost 5.5 percent of
its 1979 low-skilled workers, and 4.9 percent of its high-skilled
workers.
Since the ratio LulLs is much higher in manufacturing than
nontradeables, this translates into a far higher ratio of LulLs
"released" into the nontraded sector than is initially present in
nontradeables, as shown in Panel B of Table 4. That panel also
shows that these extra employees would have increased LulLs to
1.20 (from 1.18) for the whole nontraded sector, and to 1.23
(from 1.21) for the private nontraded sector, assuming that the
private sector rather than the government absorbed them.
Table 5 then shows the effect on wages. For the whole
nontraded sector, with the counterfactual as a baseline, we see
that LunlLsn is estimated to have risen by 1.68 percent as a
result of the shifts in net trade. We can therefore calculate
the decline in Wu/Ws associated with the rise in Lun/Lsn.
Assuming an elasticity of substitution of 1/3 between Lu and Ls,
the relative wage Wu/Ws would have declined by 5.04 percent. For
an elasticity of substitution of 1/2, Wu/Ws would have declined
by 3.36 percent. For the private nontraded sector, had
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government not absorbed any workers, Lun/Lsn is estimated to have
risen by 1.80 percent as a result of the shifts in net trade.
With an elasticity of substitution of 1/3 between Lu and Ls, the
relative wage Wu/Ws would have declined by 5.39 percent. For an
elasticity of substitution of 1/2, WU/Ws would have declined by
3.40 percent. Unfortunately, we lack appropriate econometric
estimates of the short-run and long-run elasticities of
substitution between Lun and Lsn to judge which of these
estimates in more appropriate.
In addition to "deindustrialization" due to increased trade
with developing countries, WU/Ws can fall simply as the result of
a decline in PUt even without a decline in manufacturing
emploYffient t as we know from the HOS model. Much of the empirical
debate over the past two years has revolved around the question
of whether Pu has in fact declined t with Bhagwati in particular
asserting that there is no evidence of a decline in PUt and
therefore no evidence for an effect of trade on wages. Even
though the "therefore" is theoretically unjustified t the evidence
on Pu is empirically important, if not definitive.
In factt the quality of data on international trade prices
leaves much to be desired. First t recall the basis of the HOS
theory. (In the discussion that follows t we drop the convention
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that Ps = 1, and therefore carry a term equal to the nominal
change in Ps) . In a model of two goods and two factors, and with
no specialization, there is a one-to-one relationship between the
percentage change in Pulps and the percentage change in Wu/Ws.
Specifically, with technology given by S = S(Lss, Lus) and U =
U(Lus, Luu), where each function is constant returns to scale, we
know:
(25) ps ~ss * ws + (l-~ss) * wu
pu ~su * ws + (l-~su) * wu
where ~ss is the share of skilled labor in total output of sector
S, and ~su is the share of skilled labor in total output of
sector U. By assumption, ~ss > ~su. The lower-case variables
ps, pu, ws, and wu,represent the log changes of the respective
upper-case variables. It is immediate that (ws - wu) = y (ps -
pu), where y = [l/(~ss - ~su)] > 1. This is an implication of
the famous "magnification effect " : the proportionate change ln
relative wages is greater than the proportionate change in
relative prices.
The simple relationship between (ws-wu) and (ps-pu) becomes
more complicated if we take into account the distinction between
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value added and gross output, and the role of technical change.
In particular, suppose that the gross output functions can be
written as:
(26) Qs Qs(S(Lss, Lus) ,Ms)*Ts and
Qu Qu(U(Lus, Luu) ,Mu)*Tu
Here Q represents gross output. Ts and Tu are the pure levels of
technical progress in gross output in the S and the U sectors
respectively. Sand U are now defined as the value-added
functions of the two sectors. Ms and Mu are the intermediate
inputs which are combined with value added to produce gross
output.
Now, Ps and Pu are generally measured as gross output
prices. Note, however, that there is no simple relationship
between these gross output changes and relative wage changes,
because of the intervening effects of intermediate input prices
and technological change. The relationshp between output prices
and input prices is given as follows:
(27) ps
pu
{~vs*[~ss * ws + (l-~SS) * wu] + (l-~vs)*pm} TS
{~vu*[~su * ws + (l-~su) * wu] + (l-~vu)*pm} - TU
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In this expression, ~vs is the share of value added in gross
output in sector S. Now, ~ss is defined as the share of skilled
labor in value added in S (rather than as the share of skilled
labor in gross output) . TS is the proportionate change 1n total
factor productivity, and pm 1S the proportionate change 1n
materials prices. Other variables are defined analogously. We
see that before relating relative price changes to relative wage
changes, we must adjust the relative price changes to account for
technology and intermediate inputs.
expression is:
In particular, the revised
(28) (ws -wu) =y (pSI _pUI)
pSI [(ps + TS)-(l-~vs)*pm]/~vs
pu l [(pu + TU)-(l-~vu)*pm]/~vu
Price changes should be adjusted for changes in total factor
productivity, and for movements of intermediate goods prices. In
some contexts, pSI and pu' are referred to as changes 1n
"effective" prices.
Consider one relevant example. If the price of skill-
intensive goods declines, but the reason is a rise in total
factor productivity in the S sector, there is no reason to expect
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a decline in Ws/Wu. For example, the sharp decline in computer
prices in the past decade is not a cause for the decline of the
relative wage of skilled engineers that are employed intensively
In computer production, since (quality-adjusted) computer prices
are falling as a result of technological progress.
With the backdrop of equation (28), consider just how flimsy
is Bhagwati's rejection of the trade-wage linkage based on the
ostensible evidence of relative price movements. The data on
trade prices to which Bhagwati refers, from the study of Lawrence
and Slaughter (1993), are subject to at least five serious
problems. First, out of 143 3-digit manufacturing sectors, the
import price data cover only 51 sectors, and only 30 start in
1980 and run through the whole decade. Likewise, the export
price data cover only 46 sectors, and only 19 start in 1980.
Second, the trade data do not adjust for intermediate input
prices. Third, the trade data do not adjust for productivity
changes. Fourth, the trade data (like many kinds of price data)
do not adequately control for quality changes, so that the price
increases are overstated for commodities with important quality
improvements, such as computers. Fifth, trade data often do not
reflect actual transactions costs, since an important proportion
of manufacturing trade is actually within affiliates of the same
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firm. Enterprises use internal transfer prices for tax and other
purposes that may be very different from prices that apply in
arms-length transactions. We should then add the important
theoretical point that even small movements in relative prices
could be associated with rather large movements in relative
wages.
If we compare domestic u.s. prices with the prices of u.s.
imports and exports, we discover that the office machinery sector
(i.e. computers) presents a special problem. There is a vast
discrepancy between computer prices measured using the domestic
prices, constructed by the u.s. Bureau of Economic Analysis, and
the international trade prices, constructed by the u.s. Bureau of
Labor Statistics. In particular, the domestic prices fall
sharply, while the trade prices do not, probably because the
trade prices do not adequately reflect the improving quality of
the computers in international trade (so that the measured prices
vastly understate the decline of quality-adjusted prices). When
we formally test the discrepancy between trade prices and
domestic output prices for 30 overlapping sectors, we can reject
the hypothesis that the discrepancy in computer prices is due
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merely to sampling error. 5 For this reason, we always add a
dummy variable for the computer sector in cross-sectoral price
equations.
The empirical question is whether the relative price of
unskilled-intensive goods actually fell in the 1980s, as would be
a necessary condition for HOS effects to operate. To answer this
question, we rely on two data sets. For 1978-89, we use domestic
output prices for 450 4-digit manufacturing sectors based on the
1972 SIC classification (rather than the 50 or so sectors used by
Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) for which trade price data are
available for at least some time during the period 1980-90) For
1989-95, we use domestic output prices for 410 4-digit
5Let Pti be the trade price index for sector i, and Pdi be
the domestic price index for sector i, both measured in 1990 with
a base pti = Pdi = 1 in 1978. We assume that discrepancies in
the two prices are due to random errors, plus a fixed effect for
the computer sector, so that:
ln (PtijPdi) = ~o + ~l 8 i + E\
where 8 i = 1 for i=computers, and 8 i = 0 otherwise. We test the
null hypothesis that ~l = 0, which we reject at p=.OOOl. Only
one other industry dummy variable is found to be significant,
that for sugar and confectionary products, which reflects the
discrepancy between the U.S. domestic and international trade
prices caused by the highly protectionist U.S. trade regime for
sugar.
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manufacturing sectors based on the 1987 SIC classification.
These data were recently developed, and kindly provided, by Alan
Krueger, whose 1995 study reaches similar conclusions to those
reported here. Using a concordance between the 1972 and 1987
SIC classifications, kindly provided by Wayne Gray, we also merge
the two data sets to construct a single time series over the
entire interval 1978-95. For both data sets, we can construct
value added prices as well as gross output prices. For the
earlier data set, we can also try to adjust for productivity,
using an estimate of sectoral total factor productivity developed
by Wayne Gray (1989, 1992). While these TFP estimates are
carefully made given the data, they are no doubt subject to
enormous error themselves, so that we can not rely heavily on the
TFP-adjusted estimates.
Letting pi be the proportionate change in output prices of
sector i, we ask whether pi rises less (or falls more) for
unskilled-intensive sectors. Of course, the theoretically
correct measure is not output prices per se, but rather output
prices adjusted for intermediate input prices and technical
change. As a basic regression model, we use the following:
(29)
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The change in prices over a particular time period is regressed
on the sectoral share of unskilled labor in total employment, and
in principle, on industry characteristics, Zi. In fact, the only
Thus,
variable that we include for Zi is a dummy variable for the four-
digit-SIC computer sectors, which we include for reasons just
explained. The HOS hypothesis is that ~l < 0, that is,
unskilled-intensive sectors experienced smaller increases in
prices than skill-intensive sectors. We use several variants for
the time period, and for measuring prices, including: gross
output prices, value-added prices, and value-added prices
adjusted for total factor productivity. As in Krueger (1995), we
run the regression with weighted least squares, with weights
equal to the value of shipments of the sector at the start of the
sample period. Our proxy for Lu is the number of production
workers, and for Ls .the number of non-production workers.
Lu/(Lu+Ls) is the share of production workers in total
employment.
The main result, shown in Table 6, is that there is
consistent evidence that the price increases in Lu-intensive
sectors were considerably below those of Ls-intensive sectors
during the period 1978-1995. According to the estimate in column
3, based on valued-added prices and the entire time period, an
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industry with unskilled workers 30 percent of its total workforce
(i.e. Lu/(Lu+Ls) = 0.3) would have experienced a 40 percent rise
in its value added price from 1978 to 1995 relative to an
industry with a skill ratio of 90 percent. The ratios of 30
percent and 90 percent are approximately the bounds of the
highest-skilled and lowest-skilled industries in manufacturing.
Table 7 shows some examples of price changes from industries
within the top two and bottom two skill deciles. 6 The table
also shows weighted averages of price changes for the deciles
indicated. The weights are each industry's share of its decile's
1978 value of shipments. The computer industries, SIC 357, were
not included in the weighted averages because of the data
problems mentioned earlier. Weighted average prices rose in all
deciles for all time periods, but the increases for the top
deciles are well above those for the bottom deciles.
To provide an additional summary of the changes ln relative
prices, we calculate the percentage change in u.S. valued-added
prices and effective prices weighted by the share of each
6The deciles, please note, were formed from 131 3-digit
industries grouped from highest skilled (Decile 1) to lowest
skilled (Decile 10). We then labelled each 4-digit industry with
the decile of its 3-digit group. For example, 2086, soft drinks,
is within 208, beverages, which is in Decile 1.
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sector's trade with developing countries. 7 An import price index
is constructed by weighting value-added prices by weights Wi ffi ,
the share of sector i in total U.S. manufacturing imports from
developing countries. Similarly, an export price index is
constructed using the weights wi x , the share of sector l in
total U.S. manufacturing exports to developing countries. We see
in Figure 1 that the import-weighted price index falls steadily
relative to the export price index, by 21.9 percentage points
between 1978 and 1989, and by an additional 8.3 percentage points
between 1989 and 1995.
Conclusions
This paper has reviewed and extended the theoretical and
empirical debate on the linkages of U.S.-developing country trade
and U.S. wage inequ~lity between skilled and unskilled workers.
On a theoretical level, there is a wide range of models that
deliver the prediction that increased trade with low-wage
countries will increase the wage inequality between high-skilled
and low-skilled workers. It is misleading to pin all of our
attention on the baseline Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, though
7Again, only the top nine developing-country trade partners
are used.
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that baseline model is indeed enormously important and the
appropriate starting point of analysis. On the empirical front I
a considerable range of evidence also points in the direction of
at least some relative wage effects from trade l including: (1)
observed shifts in emploYment I and their relationship to observed
shifts in trade; (2) the relative skill intensity of the
manufacturing versus service sectors; and (3) the trends of
relative prices. Another look at the trade datal including
measures of value-added prices rather than gross output prices l
and an extension of the data to 1995 1 point in the direction of
falling relative prices of commodities intensive in low-skilled
labor l the kind of price effect that we expect from increased
U.S.-developing country trade l and the kind that can contribute
to a widening of wage inequalities between skilled and unskilled
workers. Further work is now required to refine both the
theoretical framework (for example I by integrating the range of
HOS and non-HOS models into a more comprehensive model) I and the
empirical work (for example I by improving the estimates of
effective prices l and by placing the data into a large-scale
econometric or simulation framework I to study general equilibrium
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Table 1. Accounting for Trade Effects on u.s. Employment
Percent




trade trade All trade
1 0.2 12.2 12.3
2 -0.9 0.9 0.0
3 -2.8 -1. 7 -4.4
4 -2.3 2.9 0.5
5 -2.0 -1. 6 -3.6
6 -5.5 -2.4 -7.9
7 -5.2 -1.4 -6.6
8 -2.6 -2.1 -4.7
9 -3.4 -6.7 -10.1
10 -23.5 -3.6 -27.1
Addendum
All manufacturing -5.7 -0.2 -5.9
Production workers -6.2 -1. 0 -7.2
Nonproduction workers -3.3 2.2 -2.1
Notes: Import figures, originally reported on a customs value
basis, have been increased by factors for c.i.f., tariffs, and
tariff equivalents of quotas. Denominator in addendum is total
manufacturing employment for the specific employment group in 1978.
Sources: Authors' counterfactual calculations described in the text
and in Sachs and Shatz (1994) based on NBER Productivity Dataset.
Table 2. Skill Level of Manufacturing, 1979 and 1990




2 1. 28 0.81
3 1. 72 1. 05
4 2.08 1.33
5 2.47 1. 79





















High School workers are those with a high school education or less.
College workers are those with at least some college. In both
cases, only full-time workers who had a job the week before the
Current Population Survey was taken were included.
In panel A, industries were ranked from high skill to low skill,
according to the ratio of college workers to high school workers,
and then grouped so that each decile would have approximately equal
levels of 1979 employment.
In panel B, a weighted average of the high school to college ratio
for all manufacturing was taken. Weights were sector shares of
exports or imports to or from the top nine LDCtrade partners (as
explained in the text) .
Sources: National Bureau of Economic Research Current Population
Survey merged data files, and u.S. Department of Commerce trade
statistics.
Table 3. High School and College Employment in Manufacturing and
the Nontraded Sector, 1979, in thousands
High School College LulLs
Manufacturing 14,378.4 5,991.0 2.40
Nontraded 26,198.0 22,278.2 1.18
Private 23,925.7 19,825.1 1. 21
Nontraded
Notes:
High School workers are those with a high school education or less.
College workers are those with at least some college. In both
cases, only those workers with a full-time job during the week
before the Current Population Survey was taken were included.
The nontraded sector includes construction; transport,
communication, and public utilities; wholesale and retail trade;
finance, insurance, and real estate; services; and public
administration. The private nontraded sector includes all of the
above except for public administration. The mining, and
agriculture, forestry, and fishing sectors, are ommitted
completely.
Source: National Bureau of Economic Research Current Population
Survey merged data files.
Table 4. Effects of Trade on Manufacturing Employment
1979 to 1990
A. Change in Employment by Country Group and Education Group
(Percent)
LDC Developed Country All
Trade Trade Trade
All employees -3.7 -1. 6 -5.3
High School Employees -4.0 -1.5 -5.5
College Employees -3.0 -2.0 -4.9












High School workers are those with a high school education or less.
College workers are those with at least some college. Only full-
time workers who held a job during the week before the Current
Population Survey was taken were included.
For the counterfactual calculations, the counterfactual change in
net imports for the computer sector has been constrained to equal
zero. In addition, eight industries were treated as pure
intermediate goods industries, so that they were considered as
producing no output for final demand. Therefore, changes in
imports or exports would not have had the mUltiplier effects seen
in other industries. The eight and their U.S. Bureau of Eeconomic
Analysis codes were:
16 Broad, narrow fabrics, mills,
25 Paperboard containers,
28 Plastics and synthetics,
33 Leather tanning and finishing,
37 Primary iron and steel,
38 Primary nonferrous metals,
39 Metal containers, and
57 Electronic components.
BEA codes were used, rather than SIC, because the Input-Output
tables used in the counterfactual are in BEA codes. In addition,
the counterfactual uses 1979 employment data and 1978 trade data.
continued
Table 4 continued
In addition, LDC trade for the counterfactual calculations includes
all developing countries, not just the top nine, as used elsewhere
in the paper.
In Panel B, the nontraded sector includes construction; transport,
communication, and public utilities; wholesale and retail trade;
finance, insurance, and real estate; services; and public
administration. The private nontraded sector includes all of the
above except public administration. The mining, and agriculture,
forestry, and fishing sectors, were omitted.
Source: Authors I counterfactual calculations using the NBER
Productivity Dataset, 1994 version, BEA 1987 annual input-output
tables, NBER CPS merged data files, and U. S. Department of
Commerce trade statistics.
Table 5. Change in Nontraded Skill Levels and Wages Due to Trade
Rise in LulLs, and Change in Wu/Ws, in the Nontraded Sector
Public and Private Nontraded
Percent Change in LulLs
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High School workers are those with a high school education or less.
College workers are those with at least some college. In both
cases, only full-time workers who held a job in the week before the
Current population Survey was taken are included.
The nontraded sector includes construction; transport,
communication, and public utilities; wholesale and retail trade;
finance, insurance, and real estate; services; and public
administration. The private nontraded sector includes all of the
above except public administration. The mining, and agriculture,
forestry, and fishing sectors, were omitted.
Source: Authors I counterfactual calculations using the NBER
Productivity Dataset, 1994 version, BEA 1987 annual input-output
tables, NBER CPS merged data files, and u.S. Department of
Commerce trade statistics.
Table 6. Regressions of Change in Price on Skill Level
Dependent Value Added Effective Output Effective
Price V.A. Output
Variable
78-89 89-95 78-95 78-89 78-89 89-95 78-95 78-89
Independent
Variables
Skill -0.34* -0.36* -0.81** -0.12 -0.26** -0.15** -0.45** -0.18**
ratio (1. 99) (2.44 ) (3.32) (1.29) (3.95) (4.23) (5.32) (2.42)
Computer -2.78** -0.14 -0.62 -0.23* -1.66** -0.13 -0.53** -1. 61**
dummy (14.83) (0.38) (1. 18) (2.21) (22.84) (1.40) (2.92) (19.70)
Constant 0.63** 0.41** 1.12** 0.65** 0.66** 0.23** 0.92** 0.59**
(4.95) (3.79) (6 . 12 ) (8.97 ) (13.31) (8.80) (14.49) (10.65)
Adj. .33 .01 .02 .01 .54 .04 .07 .47
R-squared
N 450 410 410 450 450 410 410 449
Year of 1978 1989 1978 1978 1978 1989 1978 1978
Shipments
Value Weight
t-statistics are in parentheses
* significant at .05 level
** significant at .01 level
Notes and Sources: The dependent variable is the log change of price during the indicated
time period. We use four price variables: value added price; effective value added price,
which takes account of total factor productivity; output price; and effective output price,
which is annual change in output price plus annual change in TFP. Of the independent
variables, the skill ratio is the 1978 ratio of production workers to total workers for each
sector, so that a low skill ratio number indicates a high-skill sector. The computer dummy
equals one for all four-digit industries within 3-digit sector 357 under the 1972 SIC
classification. Data sources include the NBER Productivity Dataset and Alan Krueger.





















































































Deciles are formed by ranking 131 3-digit industries by proportion
of unskilled to total employees and then grouping the industries
into 10 equal groups, such that Decile 1 is the most skilled and
Decile 10 is the least skilled. Production workers are used as a
proxy for unskilled workers. Each 4-digit industry is then deemed
to be in the decile indicated by its 3-digit group.
Price changes are discussed in the text, and show proportional
changes in the period indicated.
Decile averages are weighted averages, with the weights formed by
1978 industry shipments divided by 1978 decile shipments within
each decile.
from 1978 to 1989 are from the NBER
Price data for 1989 and 1995 are courtesy of
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Fig. 1. Growth in trade-weighted value added prices
Notes to Figure 1
This figure shows the graph of trade-weighted value added
prices for manufacturing, 1978 to 1995. Each observation is the
weighted average of the value added price for 105 3-digit
manufacturing sectors, with the weights each sector's share of
exports or imports to or from the United States' top nine LDC trade
partners. These are Brazil, China, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
In other words, each observation is:
where Wi is the weight for sector i, and Pi is the
value added price for sector i.
Weights are computed as:
where Ti
imports,
is the trade flow, either exports
for sector i to or from the nine LDCs.
or
Value added price for each sector is computed based on the
annual log change from the following equation:
Po = (3vPv + (3mPm + (3ePe'
where p is the log change in price from year t to t+1, (3 is the
share in total output, 0 is output, v is value added, m is
materials, and e is energy.
Note that figures for 1990 to 1994 are a linear extrapolation
of the 1989 to 1995 price change, as there was no data available
for 1990 through 1994. For the change from 1989 to 1995, there
were no separate figures for materials and energy costs and prices.
Rather, there were cost and price figures only for intermediates.
Sources: Output, materials, and energy total values and prices for
1978 to 1989 are from the NBER Productivity Dataset. Output
prices, intermediates prices, and share of intermediates for 1989
and 1995 are courtesy of Alan Krueger. There is no data for 1990
to 1994. For both periods, share of value added is computed as one
minus share of intermediates.
